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Trade Union Managers: Invisible Actors in Trade Union 
Dramas 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper is concerned with a group of people who are almost entirely absent 
from the literature on trade union governance, trade union managers. It looks 
at various governance models and seeks to make links between that literature 
and analogous literature in the management field, in particular between that 
on the polyarchal theory of trade union organisation and that on stakeholder 
management. It concludes that managers have become visible and that they 
seek to manage their organisations subject to a number of constraints arising 
in some cases from the fact that management remains a somewhat 
problematic concept in unions. Although the values of trade union managers 
result in their taking a positive attitude to the democratic process, the 
boundaries between their roles and the roles of elected activists in the 
governance structures are unclear and are consequently contested.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
     Very little trade union literature addresses the issue of ‘who manages 
unions.’ Dunlop (1990) looks at ‘administrative, executive and leadership 
roles’ within unions but he goes on to describe the process of union 
management as an ‘oxymoron’ (Dunlop 1990). Unions have, nevertheless 
continued to exist. In many cases they have merged; the process of merger 
management requires the utilisation of significant ‘administrative, executive 
and leadership’ processes. Yet the literature does not identify who has 
undertaken them. To most writers, they are invisible. 
 
     Mergers in unions are often (but not always) a response to adverse 
environmental factors. For UK unions, the environment over much of the last 
20 years has also been difficult. Even if it is marginally improving, those 
organizations cannot escape from the speed of change in the global 
economy. Developments in information and communication technology (ICT) 
require every membership organization to re-think its relations with its 
members and every organization employing staff to consider the most 
appropriate way to deploy them and the most effective way to provide physical 
space for them to work. UNISON has introduced access to services through a 
call centre into which its members can dial to access services and in doing so 
it has recognised that in responding to members' requests for services it is 
competing not so much with other unions but with members' perceptions of 
other organizations of which they are members, such as the AA or of other 
organizations to which they go for advice, such as a Citizen’s Advice Bureau. 
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Kelly and Heery (1994) identify the dispersal of staff by public sector unions in 
response to the decentralisation of collective bargaining. At the same time, 
falling or static membership figures, particularly among young people (Kerr & 
Waddington 1995), mean that pressures for organisational changes will 
continue. One way or another, those changes will require some form of 
management.  
 
     The objective of this paper is to answer two questions:- 
1. Do managers exist in trade unions? 
2. If so, what are the implications? 
 
The Literature 
 
Unions as organisations 
 
     ‘Governance’ is regarded in the Oxford dictionary as an old fashioned form 
of the word ‘government’. It is, however, given a slightly different meaning of 
(inter alia) ‘the act or manner of governing.’ That is the sense in which the 
word is used, in this paper. The interest is in the relationships between the 
various actors in the act of governing and the manner in which they do so. 
 
     Much of the literature analysing union governance is based on deeply 
pessimistic notions of the inevitability of oligarchy in organizations arising from 
the work of Michels (1915: 401) for whom ‘optimism will remain the exclusive 
privilege of utopian thinkers.’ ‘It is organization which gives birth to the 
dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the 
mandators, of the delegates over the delegators,’ said Michels. ‘Who says 
organization says oligarchy.’ This approach has many times been applied to 
analyses of union power structures, principally (as in Lipset et al 1956) as part 
of an argument that unions resemble one party states with the bureaucracy 
holding all the resources and the powers of communication, rendering them 
oligarchic rather than democratic. Marxist writers go further (see Kelly 1988) 
and assume the inexorable conservatism of union leaders. 
 
     The Webbs (1920) recognised the possibility that officers could develop 
different ideas and outlooks. But they believed that some form of bureaucracy 
was desirable, mainly to take account of unions becoming more complex 
organisations but also in order to regulate the members so as to protect the 
union itself from the consequences of irresponsible action. The analysis 
therefore involved recognition of the inevitability of the development of 
Weberian forms of bureaucratic organisation, understanding that this would 
lead to complex power relationships between members and officers. This 
involved recognition of the ways in which officers had on the one hand to 
remain close to the members whilst on the other hand maintaining the integrity 
of the union itself. 
 
     Marxist theorists share much of this analysis (see Kelly 1988 chapter 7), 
save that they saw the ‘irresponsibility’ of the members as evidence of the 
manifestation of class struggle and the organisational work of officers as 
evidence of their collaboration with capitalism. Indeed, Marxist writing on 
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power forms, as Hardy and Clegg (1996) point out, the root of one of two clear 
streams of writing on power in organizations, one which regards power as 
domination and actions taken to challenge it as resistance. Management 
writing (see e.g. Mintzberg 1983) regards power structures in organizations as 
reflecting legitimate, functional authority and resistance to them as illegitimate 
and dysfunctional. Almost all of the literature examining power structures in 
unions comes from the former tradition. 
 
     The role of union managers in any such structures, however, is not the 
subject of any analysis to speak of. This has the consequence that, in order to 
try to understand he activities of managers in trade unions, one has to make 
links between strands of literature from wholly different traditions.  
 
     Child et al (1973) were amongst the first to present ideas on the trade 
union as an organisational type. They review literature on the voluntary sector 
which subsumes trade unions within a broader class of organisation (cf. Blau 
and Scott 1963) but suggest that whilst union administrative and 
representative structures may both lend themselves to measurement in terms 
of Weberian bureaucratic frameworks, their rationales are qualitatively 
different. The bureaucratic dimension they characterise ‘administrative 
rationality’, which they believe conflicts with the ideal of membership 
involvement in the representative process – what they term as ‘representative 
rationality.’ The former, they suggest, is located at the top of the hierarchy; the 
latter at the grassroots.  
 
     Undy et al (1996) extend this model to include a dimension which they 
describe as ‘political rationality’ – the ultimate purpose and primary means of 
trade unions. Their study is looking at unions’ responses to Thatcherite trade 
union legislation, responses which were political. But it is not immediately 
apparent how this dimension helps one understand the critical dynamics of 
union organisation. Politics are part of the environment in which unions 
operate and, in so operating, they are seeking to represent the views of their 
members. Thus, politics are arguably a component of representative 
rationality.  
 
     Willman et al (1993) point out that both administrative and representative 
rationalities have to co-exist in the management of a trade union. They point 
out that a key skill in managing a trade union is managing the co-existence 
between administrative and representative rationality. They do this within a 
highly political environment, containing many different stakeholders. The 
external environment will include the Government, politicians and social actors 
of many types, employers and commentators. Internally, it will include not just 
members and activists but different categories of members and activists in 
constantly shifting categories. Activists participate in a union’s structure in one 
or many of the different committees or bodies set up as part of the 
representative structure. This suggests that, far from union governance being 
defined by a simple dichotomy between administrative and representative 
rationality, it involves attention to the legitimate interests of a wide range of 
stakeholders.  
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Stakeholders and Polyarchy 
 
     Various writers have described union organisation as ‘a political system in 
which a variety of interest groups whose goals are sometimes shared, 
sometimes in conflict, contend for power and influence.’ (Kelly and Heery 
(1994:15) This is usually described as the polyarchy theory of union 
organisation.  
 
     Different writers posit different bases for the definition of these power 
structures. Banks (1974) views the primary locus of competition as between 
officers and lay activists. Crouch (1982) identifies two types of union goal - 
money goals and participation goals - pursued at different levels by national 
officers, shop stewards and members. James (1984) looks at sources of 
‘legitimate’ power in a polyarchy. Kelly and Heery (1994) argue that within this 
framework it becomes possible to analyse systematically the shifting alliances 
between different groups within a union. Their own research identifies 
distinctions arising from local and national locations, gender, generation and 
ideology.  
 
     If ideas of unions as polyarchies are helpful in examining their governance, 
then ideas of stakeholder management should be helpful in examining how 
managers in trade unions manage within such a framework. Freeman (1984).  
proposed a wide definition of the term ‘stakeholder’ as ‘any group or individual 
who can affect or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s 
purpose. Donaldson and Preston (1995) import a test of legitimacy, 
suggesting that stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in 
procedural and/or substantive aspects of (corporate) activity. They make the 
point that stakeholders are identified by their interests in the organization, 
whether or not the organization has any corresponding functional interest in 
them. Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) propose a framework which enables 
one to look at stakeholders as possessing legitimacy, urgency or power and 
thus to enable managers to develop strategies for managing stakeholders 
possessing one or more of those characteristics. 
 
     Donaldson and Preston (1995) present four theses concerning stakeholder 
theory. One is that the theory is descriptive in that it presents a model of what 
an organisation is - a constellation of co-operative and competitive interests 
possessing intrinsic value. The coincidence of this theory with the basis of the 
theory of polyarchy is marked. Another thesis is that stakeholder theory is 
normative in that it involves acceptance of the legitimacy of stakeholder 
interests and the fact that they have intrinsic value. It is this that provides the 
moral basis for the theory and renders it such a suitable vehicle for the 
examination of management in unions.  
 
     A significant issue, therefore, is whether trade union managers practise 
normative stakeholder management. Investigating this may lead to the 
motives of at least one of the actors within the union being uncovered. In this 
context, ‘stakeholders within unions’ democratic structures’ means, in 
polyarchal terms the multiple cleavages (Banks 1974) between national 
managers, activists and the membership. In stakeholder terms, the phrase 
4 
means the relationship between manager stakeholders and those within the 
democratic structure who have legitimate interests in procedural and/or 
substantive aspects of activity. (Donaldson and Preston 1995). It should be 
noted that stakeholders can be in more than one category. An activist is also a 
member; she may also be a member of a women’s committee or of the 
National Executive Council. Brummer (1991), in an analogous context, 
suggests that a class of stakeholders is a shifting one. 
 
Officers, Leaders and Management 
 
     In the literature one can find much discussion of trade union officers. They 
are concerned with representing and organising members, individually and 
collectively. They also have to balance a range of complex stakeholder 
relationships, internally with individual members, branches, regional 
organisation and various levels of management as well as externally. Kelly 
and Heery (1994) found that in most unions officers were in practice subject to 
dual systems of control, from lay representatives and superiors, but with 
comparatively light control from the latter. The majority of unions studied said 
that their officers had almost complete or a great deal of autonomy in their 
work. Managers tended to exercise greater control in three main 
circumstances; allocation of responsibilities, a crisis in the officer’s work or to 
further a national campaign or policy initiative. Officers themselves valued 
their autonomy and were highly focused on serving the members for which 
they were responsible, with limited sympathy for policy initiatives which 
blurred that focus. A majority regarded accountability to the members as more 
important than accountability to union management. 
 
     Kelly and Heery’s findings stressed the significance of officers’ values, 
which they categorised as managerialist, regulationist or leader (‘resting on a 
perception of worker-employer interests as antagonistic’ p. 25). This is a 
highly loaded categorisation. A more general encapsulation of trade union 
principles (tested by the writers with not altogether encouraging results) is that 
of Batstone et al (1977:27) which includes ‘an emphasis on unity and……the 
prevention of the fractionalisation of the domestic organisation (and) some 
idea of social justice. That is, those within the collectivity are to be treated 
both fairly and equally (Brown 1973:133). This involves, on the one hand, 
ensuring that members of the collectivity are not subject to managerial 
whim……There should be no discrimination against the less fortunate, while 
the unbridled pursuit of self-interest should be minimised.’ (1977:27) 
 
     Here we see a value base which might help in considering how union 
managers behave. It does not, however, get us much nearer to identifying 
union managers. Discussion of union ‘leaders’ is not much more helpful. Undy 
and Martin (1984) describe leaders as preoccupied with institutional survival 
Their discussion of the identity of those leaders is rooted in a belief that they 
are drawn from a restricted recruitment base of ‘moral activists’. Whist this 
certainly was true and is still true in many unions, it is by no means axiomatic. 
Unions today, many of whom are seeking Investors in People status and most 
of whom have modernised their HR and recruitment processes, frequently 
advertise all posts externally, even senior ones. Whilst experience in the 
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sector is likely to be a criterion of appointment, as it is in many other 
industries, it is no longer universally true that, to become a union leader (using 
that phrase to include anyone in a senior position in a union where they have 
the ability to influence union strategy) one needs to become known by working 
(one’s) way through the branch, district and regional committees, attending 
conferences, educational courses and sometimes factional meetings (Undy 
and Martin 1984) or to have been ‘bred to the trade’ (Allen 1954:190). Nearly 
44% of the unions in Kelly and Heery’s (1994) study practised open 
recruitment. Successful candidates may still become ‘moral activists’ 
(whatever that means) but not necessarily as a result of their narrow 
institutional experience. 
 
     Overall, therefore, the literature is of little help in identifying managers and 
management. Allen (1954) noted that, as unions grew into large scale 
organisations, general secretaries required a high level of administrative 
ability. In this classic historical survey, though, he did not go as far as linking 
this with management. Björkman and Huzzard (2002) assert that the pursuit of 
a union’s mission requires to be supported by sound management practices 
but they do not identify who is responsible for that. Dempsey (2000) 
extensively discusses managerial activities taking place during and 
subsequent to the merger which created UNISON but, again, does not identify 
specifically who were UNISON managers.  
 
     Hannigan (1998), in a text which is really a primer for managing unions 
rather than one identifying what is going on, describes a union ‘officer’ as 
filling ‘the roles of union leader, workers’ representative and manager’ and 
suggests that there are conflicts between all three roles. The major discussion 
of union managers as a category is by Dunlop (1990). He makes the point that 
his observations are confined to the United States and this is clear in, for 
example, the trade union model applied which involves extensive elections of 
senior managers, rare though not unknown in the UK. Nevertheless, the 
analysis is of interest. He compares the role of ‘executives’ in four fields - 
business, government, academia and unions. He suggests that there are six 
commonalities among these categories of manager - in environmental 
analysis, setting roles and priorities, selection and development of people, 
shaping the structure of the organization, negotiating and consensus-building 
skills and generating and introducing innovation. He goes on to identify six 
differences between the four fields. Some of the assumptions are 
controversial - for example that business leaders in modern organizations 
achieve results by ‘command and control.’ Interestingly, however, except in 
one area (where it is suggested that the measure of performance of a union 
manager is the votes of the members) the distinctive elements are largely of 
degree rather than being diametric opposites. For example, there is a 
discussion of where managers in the four sectors fall on a continuum of 
efficiency and equity, the analysis of which suggests that union managers are 
in similar positions on the spectrum to academic and government managers. 
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Modes of governance 
 
     Cornforth (2002) examines the governance of public and non-profit 
organisations, an area which he says in under-theorised. He proposes a 
paradox perspective as a conceptual framework to bring together a number of 
different theoretical perspectives in a consistent manner and explain their 
domains of application. He uses the language of ‘owners’ and ‘boards’ but it is 
easy to adapt this to enlighten a discussion of the relative roles of, particularly, 
activists in unions and trade union managers who interact with them. Table 1, 
adapted from Cornforth’s article, seeks to do this.  
 
     The ideas here are of considerable interest. There will be in any union a 
variety of relationships between managers and activists. It may be, therefore, 
that other theories of governance will assist in offering explanations of how 
activists and managers relate in this area. One does not have to abandon the 
language of stakeholding in this exercise. Cornforth specifically looks at the 
interests of the different stakeholders in utilising his ideas so the application of 
those ideas remains consistent with the notion of interest groups pursuing 
legitimate goals within a trade union, seen as a polyarchy, and of trade union 
managers seeking to manage within such a framework. 
 
7 
 
 
THEORY INTERESTS EXECUTIVE 
MEMBERS 
EC ROLE MODEL 
Agency 
theory 
Activists and 
managers have 
different interests 
Representatives 
of the members 
• Conformance 
– to seek to 
safeguard the 
interests of the 
members, as 
they see them 
• Oversee 
management 
• Check 
compliance 
Compliance 
Stewardship 
theory 
Activists and 
managers share 
interests 
Experts – to 
inform 
management of 
membership 
views, to add 
political 
perspectives and 
‘add value’ to the 
relationship 
• Improve 
performance – 
add value to 
managerial 
decisions and 
strategy 
• Partner and 
support 
management 
Partnership 
model 
Democratic 
perspective 
Activists/members 
contain different 
interests 
Lay 
representatives 
• Political – 
represent 
member 
interests 
• Make policy 
• Control the 
executive 
Democratic 
model 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Stakeholders have 
different interests 
Stakeholder 
representatives 
• Political – 
balancing 
stakeholder 
needs 
• Make policy 
• Control 
management 
Stakeholder 
model 
Resource 
dependency 
theory 
Stakeholders and 
organisation have 
different interests 
Stakeholder 
representatives 
• Boundary 
spanning – 
secure 
resources, 
stakeholder 
relations and 
maintain 
external 
perspective 
Co-optation 
model 
Managerial 
hegemony 
theory 
Activists and 
managers have 
different interests 
Representatives 
of the members 
• Symbolic – 
ratify 
decisions, give 
legitimacy 
(managers 
have real 
power) 
‘Rubber stamp’ 
model 
Table 1 Theories of governance (adapted from Cornforth 2002) 
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Method 
 
     This research involved semi-structured interviews with 56 senior 
‘managers’ from four UK unions, all formed my merger. The rationale for this 
was that it was anticipated that managerial processes could be expected to be 
more visible in organisations where integration following merger had been 
accomplished. Interviewees, from both national and regional level, were 
chosen at random with the exception of one union where a list was provided 
of those who could be approached. All interviewees were taped and 
transcribed using Dragon v4 speech recognition software. Coding and 
analysis was undertaken using QSR NVivo v2 qualitative analysis software.  
 
Results 
 
Leadership and Management 
 
     In the world at large, senior union officials are usually called ‘leaders’, 
whether they have a leadership role in the union or not. General Secretaries in 
the UK have been turned into political figures in their own right by the statutory 
requirement for election, which was not the universal model prior to 1985. It is 
not surprising, therefore, to find a senior manager expressing the view that he 
wanted the union to reflect some of his objectives.  
 
That’s called the leadership role of the Chief Executive. My job isn’t 
just to run the union. My job is to take it somewhere.  
 
     Trade union leadership in these terms is a concept which is almost 
certainly understood – the role of senior trade unionists in ‘taking the union 
somewhere’; ’managing an idea, a crusade’ (Senior manager).. In another 
union, a senior female manager said that senior negotiating officers 
 
see themselves as the leader and they’ve got there and the rest of 
you jump because I’m the leader. They see the leader bit, they don’t 
see the manager bit. ….Their whole life has been pugilistically 
fighting for that position and they want to run the staff on that basis. 
…Unions are very male cultures and a lot of very able women are 
intimidated.  
 
    Perhaps leadership, then, is a rather macho activity – managing the rhetoric 
as much as anything. Can union managers, however, be identified? In one 
union, according to one General Secretary, there were around 30-35 people 
from the General Secretary down to central services who could be identified 
as managers. Another General Secretary described a similar situation:- 
 
 Myself, the other joint General Secretary and the two deputies. 
Every national Secretary, in my view, has a managerial role. Every 
regional organiser who has staff underneath him or her has a 
managerial role and then I would go so far as to say that even head 
office functions such as education and learning all have managerial 
roles. We have said that the management of people, the 
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management of resources and the management of issues are 
things that we have to do. While we have got our ethics of trade 
unionism there is nothing wrong in using business identification 
processes and business methods to deliver what our ethics are 
about. 
 
     So the view from the top seems to be that both trade union officials and 
leaders have assumed managerial responsibilities. Did other interviewees 
accept the proposition that they had acquired these responsibilities? 
 
I think perhaps most of us would now hopefully acknowledge that 
we were managers the same as leaders. I think we probably have 
reached the point where there is generally a recognition that that is 
a role. (National Officer) 
 
On the merger, I was given a temporary post of jointly managing a 
bargaining team……….so I changed from having a main role as a 
negotiator into a role of being more of a manager but maintaining 
the role as negotiator (National Officer) 
 
I did very little management.  I was managing my own work and the 
committees that I was responsible for and working with one or two 
other National Officers and secretaries. Very little management and 
certainly no line management. So I have become a manager since 
May and I now have a large complement of staff that I am 
managing, also responsible for a budget, developing a work plan 
and conference agendas and the resolutions that arise out of that.  
So, a significant jump. (National Officer) 
 
I believe I have very direct managerial responsibility for the cultural 
tone. I take that responsibility very seriously. You know, like no 
raised voices, no swearing at staff, no aggression, all that. I expect 
people to exchange with each other on a very proper personalised 
basis. So I can have very direct influence over the culture and I feel 
responsibility for that. (Senior manager)  
 
     It may be thought that this ready acceptance of managerial roles is 
surprising. Clark and Gray (1991), citing Barbash (1959), suggest that the 
background, experience and personal characteristics of those who succeed to 
high office in unions tend to clash with the businesslike characteristics needed 
to administer a large scale organisation. And. as a manager in another union 
said above, trade union officials have been ‘pugilistically fighting’ with 
management for much of their lives. These experiences potentially 
problematise the whole concept of management:- 
 
There are some people in Headquarters, some senior full time 
officers, who say that people shouldn’t be spending too much time 
managing. They should be doing the traditional full time officer’s job 
of engaging with the employer and improving people’s terms and 
conditions. There’s obviously a connection between managing 
10 
resources properly and improving terms and conditions which I think 
is lost on some people. So there’s that kind of tension. (Senior 
manager). 
 
I think the biggest tension is the view held by a number of lay 
officials, and senior full time officers as well, that managing is not 
profitable time. …Management as I have described it is 
undervalued (Senior manager) 
 
You get your street cred. from your bargaining role rather than from 
your management role’. That role is what gives you a name and a 
reputation within the union. (National Officer) 
 
It is a bit problematic but it's only problematic because people 
haven't got their head round it yet and they have not got used to this 
style of management and they haven't got used to being anything 
other than autonomous (National Officer) 
 
We had the management development courses recently.  The one I 
went on was mostly for regional staff, which was really interesting 
because it meant you actually met regional managers and they 
seemed to be completely variable.  Some of them were kind of like -
- what?  Management?  -- and others were kind of fantastic, really 
impressive. (Functional manager)  
 
     Kelly and Heery (1994) found that many senior officers did not view the 
deliberate management of their subordinates as a priority. What seems to be 
emerging is that a change is taking place. It may not be universal – indeed, in 
the light of a culture of ‘pugilisation’ it would be surprising if it were – but a 
change seems to be visible. 
 
     If management, therefore, is a developing role within trade unions, is it 
different in any respect from managing elsewhere? Dunlop (1990), it will be 
recalled, suggested areas of difference. Opinions vary about this. In one union 
the political system was felt to be unique and managing in such a system was 
not something in respect of which there was a parallel in other sectors. But 
other differences were identified:- 
 
 
Customer Service 
I suppose the other thing really is that you have not got the 
pressure from your customer (Functional manager) 
 
Business Orientation 
If this was local government, we’d have lost the contract! 
(Functional manager) 
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Training 
The major difference between trade union managers and 
managers in other sectors is that trade union managers are not 
usually trained in management. (Senior manager) 
 
Thinking ‘outside the box’ 
We had some outsiders come in, like L.S., …..and she would do 
things outside the box and that brought tensions, a bit like ‘don’t 
do that sort of thing.’ (Senior manager) 
 
Committees 
I think there is one very marked difference in that unions seem 
to have far more meetings to discuss operations….the biggest 
difference is that there seems to be this layer of committee 
management which is not apparent to the world at large (Senior 
manager) 
 
Lack of profit orientation 
I think the biggest difference between the union and an outside 
operation is that we are not profit-orientated. We are not profit 
driven. Therefore we don’t all stand the same side of the net for 
that reason. (Senior manager) 
 
Inability to change the ‘product’ 
We are the oil tanker in the middle of the channel. We can’t 
switch and change. We can’t suddenly say ‘well, we’ll buy red 
plastic.’ (Senior manager)  
 
     Dunlop (1990) suggested that performance management is not something 
that trade union managers undertake. Whilst there is some support for this, 
there are attempts in most of the unions researched to form an objective-
setting and monitoring process. In one, a new General Secretary has 
instituted a strategic planning process which not only sets SMART objectives 
but, in a public document, identifies which senior manager is responsible for 
achieving those objectives, saying that  
 
the main reason of course if you have a plan, people are 
accountable to that plan. 
 
     Similarly, there is some assent to the notion that personnel constraints 
exist, particularly with regard to appointments and disciplining of staff.  
 
The personnel role is, I think, limited because of lay involvement in 
the democratic structure and the number of people who might be 
involved in decision-making, particularly appointments and the 
whole political influence there.  I think you can't be purists in 
personnel practice in trade unions.  It doesn't happen. (Functional 
manager)  
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Values and Management 
 
     Noticeable have been two distinct schools of thought about the topic of 
discipline. One is that lack of perceived ability to discipline staff is a major 
constraint – that ‘there are people who shouldn’t be paid in washers’ who are 
still employed. The other is that disciplining does take time but that this is 
rooted not only in institutional personnel constraints but in a belief that trade 
union managers, because of their values of fairness and a belief that people 
should be able to achieve their potential at work, were happy to go the extra 
mile to help people. Management style does often seem to have a values 
foundation:- 
 
In a union, an open style is the only style. (Senior manager) 
 
We looked at this concept of Emotional Intelligence. This was 
deemed to be the approach that we ought to adopt in terms of our 
management style. I mean, I am very sympathetic towards having 
that sort of approach. We are going to go with our values, aren't 
we? (Regional manager)  
 
There probably are key things about being open, trying to involve 
people and trying to get people on your side. (National Officer) 
 
Initially the side of management that I like doing is very much being 
about motivating people and looking at what people are good at and 
trying to encourage them to go a bit further, that kind of thing, I 
suppose.  Soft management, I suppose.  And I think that suited the 
union fairly well (Functional manager) 
 
I think it is probably personal values both make you a trade unionist 
and that says something about the way you see people. That 
comes through in the way the you manage (Functional manager) 
 
My thing about being a trade unionist is that you need to have the 
sensitivity of a butterfly and the hide of a rhinoceros. You know, you 
have got to be both (Senior manager) 
 
     The overriding impression at this stage, is that many trade union managers 
seem concerned in their management roles that ‘those within the collectivity 
are to be treated both fairly and equally ‘(Brown 1973; Batstone et al 1976). 
Whether in practice their theory in use reflects their espoused theory (Argyris 
1976) is a matter for further research.  
 
 
     There are two further areas in particular where values are particularly 
evident. The first is in resource allocation:- 
 
It is often said by the larger groups that the smaller groups get more 
resources pro rata and I’m sure that’s true. That’s what we have 
unions for. When push comes to shove, you are able to manage 
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these groups because you come back to them and say; ‘ it is right 
that smaller groups, of perhaps lower paid workers, get more of our 
resources because we are a trade union.’ It’s one of the advantages 
of managing a trade union that often you can go back to the first 
instincts of why people join trade unions to help you manage the 
organisation as well. (Senior manager) 
 
All of the groups are competing for inevitably scarce resources. 
Where do you retreat to defend your decision? Well, yes, why not; 
we are trade unionists and you have to be able to defend your 
decision on some sort of trade union principles. (Senior manager) 
 
If you go back to core trade union principles in allocating resources 
you must have regard to the scale of the problem that the member 
is facing and if you move too far away from that as an allocation for 
resources you potentially get corrupt, if you know it I mean (Senior 
manager) 
 
     Secondly, in resolving conflicts between stakeholders, managers seem 
often to adopt conciliation techniques, bringing people together to work 
through an issue and decide it, which reflects closely the core activities which 
most trade unionists will engage in:- 
 
Bringing people in.  Not excluding one of the interests -- bringing 
them in and trying to sort it out.  And usually you can sort it out. 
(Senior manager) 
 
I guess what I do is, normally I will bring people together to do that.  
That's the way that we tend to work. We identify a problem or an 
issue, we identify a range of interested stakeholders or interested 
individuals -- you know, it is an issue for officers, is the an issue for 
lay members, it is an issue of both, it is an issue where we have got 
to get officers together first and then get lay members together and 
you either deal with it through a series of individual consultations or 
you deal with it by bringing people together around the table in a 
much more structured way.(National Officer)  
 
The job of a trade unionist is to look for areas of commonality 
(Senior manager) 
 
There are overlapping circles of interest and it is getting to the 
central core, knowing what the central core is and influencing that 
and trying to build it out so that you get a consensus on what you 
are trying to achieve. If you can usually get the central core on 
board you can usually bring the others in as well.  The process is 
networking around to get majority support for a particular approach 
and the networking is done initially with the core group and you 
identify who the other stakeholders are that you need to bring on 
board (Senior manager)  
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Values and Stakeholder Management 
 
     We have seen how values can influence functional management. Now we 
consider how they may influence stakeholder management. The implications 
of the Marxist/Michelsian critique of trade union officials is that, somewhere 
along the road of a journey from member to activist to paid official, principles 
fade.  
 
     First, howare stakeholders identified? In one union, 52 stakeholder groups 
can be identified from the rule book. These include members, activist 
structures at different levels of the union’s governance structures, senior staff 
(not managers, by that name), sectoral groups, groups of members defined by 
equal opportunity categories, ex-members of partner unions and delegations 
to various representative structures. Employers’ structures are also referred 
to. Furthermore, under its powers in the rule book, the NEC has set up fora of 
members covering some policy areas, such as pay policy, acting as 
consultative bodies on these issues.  
 
We find these are very useful opportunities for two way interchange 
from the centre to the various organisations we have and back 
again. And it’s a reasonably effective way of making sure that 
people who are key players at different levels of the union 
understand what the union’s trying to do and have an opportunity to 
influence it. (Senior manager) 
 
     The Rule Book does not seem, however, to be particularly significant in 
determining stakeholder legitimacy in practice. The approach which they take 
to the legitimate roles of lay members seems to be more value based than 
legalistic:- 
 
I said that I wanted some lay members involved in the (pay 
bargaining) process………and we did it and it worked really well 
and this year I have been the only full time officer in the process 
with one of the Executive working with me and a big team involved 
as well. (National Officer) 
 
There should be a healthy balance in the organisation between the 
lay structure, which is accountable in terms of its election...and the 
full timers who see themselves as the professionals. (National 
Officer) 
 
Well, I think, though it can sound terribly trite, that you have to give 
them the importance of their elected position. You’ve got to 
recognise that their elected position is important to the organisation, 
that they are not there as voting fodder. (Senior manager) 
 
They (elected lay members) are viewed, I think, either as absolutely 
critical to keep on board through to their being a waste of space and 
having to work round them rather than with them (National Officer) 
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     This latter comment touches on the complexity required in analysing 
managerial attitudes towards stakeholder legitimacy in merged organisations 
in which organisational values differed substantially. Mergers involve cultural 
clashes in which the relationships between stakeholders are exposed, as 
Dempsey & McKevitt (2001) noted in the context of the Unison merger.  
 
     The research identifies ‘claims of power’ and consequent boundary 
disputes and these are real issues here. Managers do not dispute their lines 
of accountability:- 
 
The Executive calls the tunes and I shape the activities, the actions 
and the approaches of our bargainers towards that (Senior 
manager) 
 
As far as accountability is concerned, the lay structure in fact judges 
the outcomes of senior managers’ work, who are therefore exposed 
all the time to criticism of their work. So there is a direct, immediate 
system of feedback. (Senior manager)  
 
     Furthermore, there is sometimes a proactive approach to getting lay 
members involved:- 
 
You really have got to have a consensus if things are going to work. 
It’s no good us trying to pursue a certain path of management style 
that is going to be opposed by the people at the top of the union. 
They do have some power at the end of the day.(Senior manager) 
 
     Nevertheless, ambiguities within these power relationships are very much 
in evidence:- 
 
Where does the power lie? That is the huge tension that is in the 
organisation at present. The senior lay officials say that the power is 
theirs; the joint General Secretaries, or at least one of them, says 
the power is with him to make the decision, as the chief supervisory 
officer, which is a description in the Rule Book. But I think the Rule 
Book is unclear. (Senior manager) 
 
It might be a bit difficult at times because you have to satisfy the 
different expectations of the member, the National Executive 
Committee and the factions that make up the politics of the 
organisation. (Senior manager) 
 
The tensions are that you make bad calls, bad decisions, you do 
things for the wrong reasons, or you find a way round it, or you try 
and work with the groupings and rub up with them and offer them 
something in return for them giving you something to deliver a vote 
through a committee or whatever. (Senior manager) 
 
     Although this sounds somewhat despairing, others are quite clear about 
how to manage the boundaries:- 
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It (setting up a new team) was not put to them (lay members). I 
have a strong view that this is not their role. And, in fact, I have 
stopped them coming into the office now like they used to do and 
sitting in the office. In my view, it disrupts the office. (National 
Officer) 
 
In (my old union), there was probably too much involvement of the 
day to day running of the office by senior lay officials which I never 
see as part of their function. The General Secretary allowed that 
interference, which I think is wrong. Now…there isn’t that sort of 
involvement. (National Officer)  
 
My role is making recommendations to committees; theirs is taking 
a decision and telling me what is acceptable and what isn’t. We 
have clear roles and the running of the team is certainly my job and 
not that of elected people. (National Officer)  
 
     There are contested areas of responsibility here even though the principle 
of accountability to lay members is uncontested. These issues are important 
in the whole area of the behaviour of union managers, whether as 
stakeholders in a polyarchic structure or as actors in a struggle between lay 
members and appointed officials in which the latter deployed their expertise in 
union affairs against dissidents and exploited their monopoly of the union’s 
administrative resources, as Marxist theorists suggest. 
 
Governance and Stakeholder Management 
 
     The literature assumes that those at the structural apex of unions see their 
roles in terms of control. Kelly and Heery (1994) note the relative autonomy of 
field officers and counterpose it with ‘more intense management control over 
officers’ work’. They analyse the relative accountability of field officers to lay 
committees and to management and the dichotomy which this sometimes 
creates. And, indeed, Marxist and Michelsian traditions assume that union 
leaderships are inevitably counterposed against the grassroots membership. 
Fairbrother (1994) complains that management initiatives weakened the 
powers of local leaders, with the intention not of increasing effectiveness but 
imposing control. 
 
     In many cases, this pessimistic view is not supported:- 
 
That’s all I want to do, to give power to the members. People can 
say that’s a left or right wing agenda. You can pay your money and 
take your choice, but it’s pretty radical stuff. (Senior manager) 
 
I am facilitating them in the process of hopefully taking ownership of 
the product. (National Officer) 
 
Inside our rule book there are four or five key groups or committees 
who are almost autonomous. The trick is to give them autonomy, to 
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delegate to them properly responsibility for their decision making 
process. (Senior manager) 
 
My view is that when people say, democracy is majority rule I say, 
it's not.  It's majority rule with the consent of the minority.  The 
minority must feel that they count as much (Senior manager). 
 
     However, there is little doubt that in practice boundaries between 
managers and lay stakeholders in the governance structures are contested 
areas:- 
 
Sometimes there is a desire of the Executive to actually try and run 
the administration or to interfere in it in ways that are not always 
helpful (Senior manager) 
 
What has happened in this organisation because of the splits 
amongst the full timers is that the lay structure has assumed 
disproportionate power (Senior manager) 
 
Very few lay members seem to know the difference between 
governance and management. Many of them want to get involved in 
management rather than just governance. (Senior manager) 
 
Even now, I am not sure that people are clear at all what their limits 
of authority are and, if they have got them, whether they work within 
them or whether they are quite extended (Functional manager) 
 
     This suggests that polyarchal relations, where stakeholders compete for 
power and influence, are demonstrable in respect of the relations between 
managerial and democratic stakeholders. Managers, practise stakeholder 
management. The research suggests, however, that they actively manage the 
boundaries between their own spheres of authority and those of lay members 
within the governance structures of their unions. They choose a variety of 
strategies – some co-operative but some competitive – for example, power 
strategies, institution of financial controls, manipulating interest groups or use 
of the Rule Book to defeat lay challenges. Whilst this behaviour is spread 
more or less consistently on a continuum between co-operative and 
competitive, the evidence does not suggest that normative stakeholder 
management is the significant mode of managerial behaviour that had been 
anticipated in respect of the governance structures of trade unions. 
 
     In terms of modes of governance, the evidence so far adduced does not 
suggest that managers recognise the ‘rubber stamp’ model; indeed, several 
managers suggested that it was an outdated concept.  Very many managers 
recognised and espoused the partnership model, but there was little 
agreement as to what it involved. In one union, attempts had been made to 
define the lay member zone, the officer zone and a ‘shared zone’ but this work 
had not been completed and the consequence was that, although managers 
were enthusiastic about their positive relationships with lay members:- 
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The tensions that we have with lay members in that big area that we 
used to call the grey area, the shared zone; it’s not so much people 
sharing, it’s people walking about blindfolded (Senior manager) 
 
     Cornforth (2002) suggests that a criterion for this model is the assumption 
on the part of activists that managers want to do a good job and are effective 
stewards of the union’s resources – something dependant on a high trust 
environment. This is not always evident, as some of the evidence quoted 
above demonstrates.  
 
     In most cases, the stakeholder model is the one that is most clearly 
articulated. One manager saw his core managerial skill in terms of managing 
stakeholder conflict:- 
 
My role is in some ways a facilitator. You have the staff, the full time  
officers, all with roles and responsibilities. You have the lay structure of 
the union who have their agenda, their priorities and sometimes those 
have to be brought into one. Sometimes there is huge potential for 
conflict, particularly when you start looking at things like money, 
budgets, priorities, the way you go. So, facilitating in terms of trying to 
bring those two together. (Functional manager).  
 
     The fact that such conflict exists and that boundary disputes proliferate 
suggests that many lay activists reject co-operative models and have 
aspirations to establish models of governance based on control of officials by 
activists – ‘compliance’ or ‘democratic’ models. The role of managers in such 
an environment is likely to be much more constrained although it appears that 
ambiguity in relationships is commonplace.  
 
Conclusions 
 
     Over many years, trade unions have been managed without any outward 
acknowledgment of how that has been done and who has been doing it. 
These phenomena have been invisible. In this research, trade union 
managers have been visible. In some respects, they remain embarrassed by 
some aspects of their roles. The role continues to have problematic features 
and to be constrained in some respects – most notably on the issue of 
performance management. Nevertheless, values seem significant in the way 
in which they determine how to undertake their roles. This is particularly 
significant in how trade union managers articulate their approach to 
management style. Research amongst their staff would be required to draw 
conclusions about the extent to which these articulated values are translated 
into practice. Failure to do so would not necessarily indicate lack of principle; it 
could, for example, indicate lack of training and consequent lack of knowledge 
of how to translate principles into practice in managerial roles. In this, trade 
union managers would be similar to many other untrained managers. 
 
     These actors within trade unions interface with their unions’ democratic 
governance structures. Their values lead them to articulate positive views 
about those structures and to be, in many cases, pro-active in improving 
19 
them. In doing this, they can be said to practise stakeholder management. 
However, boundaries are in many cases unclear and hence are contested. 
Managers adopt a range of strategies. Some could be said to be based on 
their espoused values and are co-operative. Whilst behaviour spans a 
continuum, some is competitive and, in such cases, relations take on the form 
of those predicted by the theory of polyarchy; stakeholders contend for power 
and influence. 
 
     Whist trade union managers may practise stakeholder management, this 
does not mean that they do so within a stakeholder model of governance. The 
model most frequently articulated is the partnership model but high trust 
relationships which are a feature of Cornforth’s (2002) outline of that model do 
not always exist. The fact, however, that lay activists contest boundaries 
suggest that they engage in behaviour designed to increase their own ability 
to control management and that, therefore, models reflecting that (in 
Cornforth’s (2002) terms, compliance or democratic models) may be their 
goal. The stakeholder model, whilst it recognises that stakeholders have 
different interests, arguably requires rather more defined boundaries than it 
seems possible to recognise on the basis of this research. 
 
     These discussions do, however, suggest that Cornforth’s (2002) framework 
does offer the prospect of enlightening debates about trade union governance 
structures which have too long been rooted in what Kelly and Heery (1994) 
describe as the over-simplistic bureaucracy versus rank and file division 
(p196). This is something common to much of the literature about trade 
unions and their activities. In this research, however, trade union managers 
have become visible, occupying a significant and distinctive role in the 
administration and governance of trade unions. Potentially, this fact is of 
considerable significance in future studies of trade union life. The behaviour of 
managers, vis-à-vis trade union organisation, trade union staff and trade union 
lay activists, is influenced by different factors and is of a different character 
from that which has featured in most trade union literature to this point. It 
needs to be factored into the debate.  
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